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Abstract 
We explore the relationship between political ideology and public attitudes towards a range 
of energy technologies (namely: biomass, coal, shale (or coal seam) gas, natural gas, carbon 
capture and storage, hydroelectricity, nuclear, solar thermal and photovoltaic, wave and wind 
energy). Our empirical analysis draws on the results of two similar nationally representative 
public surveys that were conducted in Australia and the UK in 2017. Our findings suggest 
that political ideology is significantly associated with public attitudes towards energy 
technologies. Specifically, supporters of left-leaning political parties tend to be more 
supportive of renewables and opposed to biomass, shale (coal seam) gas, nuclear and fossil 
fuel energies compared to right-leaning individuals. We also create an alternative ideological 
proxy to capture the relative emphasis that parties place on the environment and economy 
and find that supporters of environmentally focused parties generally express similar energy 
preferences to left-leaning individuals and economy-focused respondents align with right-
leaning attitudes. Our findings are robust to different choices of proxy.   
 
Introduction 
The growing scientific and political consensus surrounding the need for effective mitigation 
to prevent dangerous levels of global warming has secured renewable energy sources and 
other low-carbon technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) a central place in 
national energy and climate policy debates. However, while the deployment of renewable 
energy technologies has rapidly increased in recent years2, this has not been the case for CCS 
(Reiner 2016). Efforts to explain empirical pathways of the energy transition emphasise the 
importance of public acceptance in facilitating, or obstructing, the deployment of energy 
technologies (e.g. Karlstrom and Ryghaug 2014; Ashworth et al. 2019; Marques et al. 2010; 
Devine-Wright 2008; Sovacool 2009; McGowan and Sauter 2005).  
Public attitudes towards energy technologies have been attributed to various tangible factors 
such as proximity to project sites (Schively 2007), income levels (Israel and Levinson 2004) 
and age (Dietz et al. 2007). Recent scholarship emphasises the role of socio-psychological 
 
1 ZC and DMR acknowledge funding from NERC grant NE/P019900/1 and EPSRC grant P/K000446/2. MF 
and PA acknowledge funding from UQ-Surat Deep Aquifer Appraisal Project (UQ-SDAAP) supported by the 
Australian Government through the Carbon Capture and Storage Research Development & Demonstration Fund 
(CCS RD&D), by ACA Low Emissions Technology (ACALET, through Coal21 Fund), and University of 
Queensland.  
2 The average annual global growth rate in modern renewables (i.e. excluding hydro energy) is 5.4 percent over 
the last decade (2008-2018) (REN21 2019).  
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sources such as knowledge about the various energy technologies (Hobman and Ashworth 
2013); environmental beliefs (Sovacool 2009; Tranter 2011; Itaoka et al. 2014); trade-offs 
between the costs, risks and benefits (Huijts, Molin and Steg, 2012); the way that each energy 
technology is framed (Corner et al. 2011; Wiest et al. 2015); and the potential for pseudo-
opinions (de Best-Waldhober et al 2009). There have also been a small handful of 
comparative studies across jurisdictions (Reiner et al, 2006; Aas et al 2014; Schumacher et al 
2019). Yet despite the highly political nature of energy policy, surprisingly little research has 
been conducted to understand the influence of political ideology on public acceptance of 
energy technologies (Karlstrom and Ryghaug 2014). Building on the rich strand of political 
psychology scholarship that asserts that partisanship causes voters to harmonise personal 
opinions in-line with their party’s position (e.g. Gerber et al. 2010; Redlawsk 2002), we 
empirically investigate the role of political ideology in shaping public attitudes towards 
energy technologies by undertaking ordinary least squares regression of survey results 
obtained from similar public attitude questionnaires conducted in Australia and the UK in 
2017.  
It is often argued that along a left-right continuum, left-of-centre parties tend to ascribe 
higher values to the environment vis-à-vis competing interests than those on the right-of-
centre (McCright et al. 2016; Neumayer 2004; Lachapelle et al. 2012; Tranter and Booth 
2015). The former also tend to be more supportive of government intervention in the 
economy (Potrafke 2017; Baskaran 2011), which is conducive to the deployment of large-
scale centralised energy projects that typically rely on state sponsorship in the initial 
deployment stages. Drawing on this literature, several scholars (e.g. Cadoret and Padovano 
2016; Karlstrom and Ryghaug 2014) argue that left-leaning individuals are likely to favour 
renewables over fossil fuels, which could be labelled as reflecting concern for the 
environment, in contrast to right-leaning  individuals, who are expected to be more 
dismissive about climate change and, therefore, less supportive of renewable energies. On 
one hand, given greater concern about the environment, and therefore, climate change, it 
might be expected that left-leaning individuals would  be more likely to support the 
deployment of CCS as an effective means to combat climate change (Karlstrom and Ryghaug 
2014; Neumayer 2004). On the other hand, concern over potential local environmental risks 
and the potential for continued reliance on fossil fuels may lead these left-leaning individuals 
to remain opposed to CCS projects (e.g. Vogele et al. 2018).  
The role of political ideology in influencing public energy preferences has implications for 
the social feasibility of decarbonisation policies and net zero commitments, particularly since 
any ability to meet an ambitious climate target appears to be increasingly reliant on rapidly 
upscaling low-carbon and negative emissions technologies (principally CCS-based options) 
(IPCC 2014, 2018). Therefore, a better understanding about the role of political ideological 
factors in shaping public attitudes towards these key energy policies would help identify 
potential areas of conflict between ideological perspectives and policy options for energy 
transition. This research is especially pertinent for democratic contexts, where policymakers 
are often reluctant to adopt energy policies if they expect their electorates will be 
unsupportive (Poortinga et al. 2011,2019), as well as for nascent technologies such as CCS, 
which are often obstructed due to strong public opposition undermining their ‘social licence 
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to operate’ (Dowd and James 2014:364). Better understanding of the ideological sources of 
opposition towards energy technologies also presents an opportunity to assess the 
effectiveness of potential strategies such as communication frames (Wiest et al. 2015; 
Feldman and Hart 2018) and political compromises (Kousser and Tranter 2018) in addressing 
issues of concern to bridge partisan divides.  
Despite both being parliamentary democracies and advanced industrialised economies, 
Australia and the UK have followed very different paths of energy transition. While both 
countries have pledged to contribute to global mitigation efforts by deploying more low 
carbon energy sources such as renewables, it is widely agreed that the UK’s nationally 
determined contribution (NDC) to international mitigation efforts is significantly more 
ambitious than that of Australia. At Paris, Australia pledged to reduce its emissions by 26 to 
28 percent by 2030 relative to 2005 (Government of Australia 2015) and in late 2020 simply 
recommitted to this target with no increase in ambition, which led to significant criticism at 
home and abroad (Readfern, 2021). By contrast, the original UK NDC was to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 40 percent in 2030 relative to a 1990 baseline, in line with those 
of other EU member states at the time. More recently the UK substantially increased its target 
to 68 percent by 2030 in line with its commitment to net zero as part of its five-year 
resubmission (HM Government 2020).  
Each country’s energy policies and associated infrastructure investment over the last decade 
reflect similar differences. In the UK, renewable electricity generation increased from one 
percent to around a third of total electricity generation between 2000 and 2018 (BEIS 2019), 
while the share of fossil fuel energy fell from 75 percent in 1990 to 43 percent of total energy 
generation in 2019 (National Grid 2020). In Australia, the share of renewables of total 
electricity generation approximately doubled from around ten to twenty percent from 1992 to 
2018 (DEE 2019a). Fossil fuels, however, continue to be the primary source of electricity, 
despite having fallen from around 87 to 79 percent of total electricity generation over the 
same period (Ibid. 2019). Growth in renewable energy deployment has been uneven in both 
countries, with wind accounting for around half of energy generation in Scotland (BEIS 
2019) and solar a similar share in South Australia (DEE 2019b).  
Historically, policy approaches in each country can be traced to the development of their 
energy resources and the role of energy and natural resources in the respective economies. 
However, over the past 10-15 years there has been a notable divergence in the politics 
surrounding the energy transition. In the UK, where (largely imported) coal energy has 
steadily been declining over the past half century, all of the major political parties (the 
Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats) agreed the country should aim to become a 
leader of the low carbon energy transition. This is demonstrated, for example, by the Low 
Carbon Transition Plan (HM Government 2009) and Carbon Plan (HM Government 2011) 
which were respectively put in place by Labour and Conservative/ Liberal Democrat 
coalition governments, although this consensus has subsequently faded as right-wing 
members of the Conservative Party, who are opposed to climate policy, became more 
influential within the party (Lockwood 2013; Carter 2014).  . In contrast, any energy 
transition is a highly contentious issue in Australia. Australia is one of the world’s largest 
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coal and natural gas producers and exporters. In the 2018-19 financial year, 25 percent of the 
country’s total export earnings were derived from these commodities (Department of Foreign 
Affairs & Trade, 2020). While all of the major Australian parties (Australian Labor Party, 
Liberal Party of Australia and National Party of Australia) agree that more renewables should 
be deployed3, disagreement over the share of renewables of total energy, whether or not fossil 
fuels should be phased out and the target date for net zero emissions have been far more 
polarised across the major parties in comparison to the UK. Although individual Australian 
states have aggressive renewable and net zero targets, there is no comparable climate target at 
the federal level.  Climate change, in particular, has been a major cleavage across and within 
parties and was a contributing factor in several changes in leadership of both the Labor and 
Liberal parties, including multiple changes of prime ministers. Thus, if political ideology is 
associated with public acceptance of energy technologies, it is interesting to explore whether 
it contributes to the formation of more disparate views in the Australian context where energy 
technologies are politically more polarising. 
We analyse the results of two similar public surveys that were conducted in the UK and 
Australia in 2017 to investigate empirically the relationship between political ideology and 
public attitudes towards a range of energy technologies. Our analysis suggests that, broadly, 
those who vote for parties on the political right are more likely to express support for the 
deployment of fossil fuels, nuclear energy and CCS while those who vote for the political left 
tend to be more supportive of renewable energies. These findings cohere with previous 
observations about the role of political ideology in shaping attitudes towards energy 
technologies (e.g. Feldman and Hart 2018; Tranter 2011,2013; Fielding et al 2012), which 
has important implications for the popularity and social feasibility of energy policy (e.g. 
Weist et al. 2015; Poortinga et al. 2019). We also find evidence that supporters of 
environmentally-oriented political parties, such as the Greens, tend to hold similar attitudes to 
those of a leftist disposition and express higher support for renewables relative to fossil fuels, 
CCS and nuclear energy, while adherents of economic-focused parties express more support 
for fossil fuels, CCS and nuclear energy relative to renewables. Our results are robust to 
proxy choice including both continuous and categorical measures of political ideology.  
This paper consists of six sections. The next section draws on the political psychology 
scholarship that explores the effect of political ideology on public attitudes and the literature 
on ideology and environmental perceptions to develop a theoretical framework for 
investigating the effect of ideology on public attitudes towards energy technologies. Section 
three describes the surveys, variables, coding and method of analysis used in this research. 
Section four discusses the results from our primary model of left-right ideological orientation. 
Section five presents the results of two sets of robustness tests: the first repeats the 
regressions replacing our ideology variable with an alternative continuous and categorical 
proxies of left-right orientation; while the second test posits an alternative measure of 
ideology centring on environmental versus industrial focus and analyses the effects of this 
 
3 23.5 percent renewable electricity generation as a share of total electricity by 2020 is the most conservative 
target set by the LNP. 
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alternative ideological framework on energy attitudes. The last section reflects on the 
findings to identify some key theoretical and empirical implications.   
Theorising the influence of political ideology over public attitudes towards renewable 
energy and CCS 
While public attitudes towards energy technologies have been attributed to various tangible 
factors such as perceived costs and benefits of different energy sources (L’Orange Siego et al. 
2014), proximity to deployment sites (Schively 2007), income level (Israel 2004), gender 
(Sundstrom and McCright 2016) and age (Dietz et al. 2007), recent studies devote more 
attention to socio-psychological sources. Leading examples of such explanations include the 
level of knowledge about different energy technologies (Hobman and Ashworth 2013; Ogarra 
et al. 2005), belief in the anthropogenic origin of climate change (Dowd et al. 2014; Itaoka et 
al. 2014) as well as broader worldviews (Sovacool 2009; Tranter 2011) and the way that each 
technology is framed and communicated (Corner et al. 2011; Koot et al. 2016).  
Yet very little work has been done on the relationship between political ideology and voters’ 
energy preferences. As Karlstrom and Ryghaug (2014) point out, this gap in the literature 
may be because environmental and energy issues do not easily fit within the traditional left-
right typology, making it difficult to align different energy preferences with political parties. 
Nonetheless, there are grounds to argue that voters are likely to adopt their political party’s 
position towards energy technologies and the environment. Even if these issues are not 
central to an individual’s political ideology, parties can influence voters by placing value on 
other issues, thereby ‘de-sensitising’ individuals to environmental and energy technology 
issues (e.g. Gerber et al. 2010; Redlawsk 2002; Karlstrom and Ryghaug (2014). Gillard 
(2016), for example, finds that right-leaning policymakers and media contributed to the 
unravelling of climate consensus under the Conservative-Liberal coalition government (over 
2010-2015) in the UK by taking a strategic decision not to make climate change a central 
theme.  Moreover, political ideologies provide individuals with a shared belief and value 
system, which shapes how they view and react to the world (Jost et al. 2011). Thus ideology 
performs an important cognitive function by acting as a ready framework for organising and 
analysing information about policy issues (Huckfeldt et al. 1999). Indeed, partisanship has 
been found to influence public attitudes towards several issue-areas such as government 
spending (Thomas and Evans 2005), immigration (Knoll et al. 2011) and science (Blank et al. 
2015). Causality can also flow in the opposite direction as individuals are likely to vote for 
the party which complements their pre-existing value and beliefs. Unlike in the UK, voting in 
Australia is compulsory, which creates a large proportion of swing voters who are likely to 
exhibit less stable ideological and political affiliations.   
Several studies have investigated the effect of political ideology on public attitudes towards 
environmental issues, particularly in relation to climate change. Many have found that 
supporters of left-leaning ideologies tend to hold stronger concerns about global warming 
than their conservative counterparts (McCright et al. 2016; Hamilton 2007; McKewon 2012; 
Neumayer 2004; Lachapelle et al. 2012; Tranter and Booth 2015). In the Australian context, 
Fielding et al. (2012) find that politicians from centre-left and progressive parties (the Labor 
and Green parties) exhibit beliefs that are more consistent with the scientific consensus that 
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climate change is happening than non-aligned or conservative politicians. Similarly, in the 
UK, Poortinga et al (2011) find that Conservative voters are more likely to be climate 
skeptics. There is a broad assertion in the literature that voters of left-wing parties generally 
place higher value on the environment than right-wing voters, who allegedly prioritise other 
interests such as the economy and industry, with the political centre falling somewhere in-
between these extremes.  
While these divisions have been attributed to various ideological differences, two 
fundamental points of contention stand out. First, there is disagreement over what is the role 
of the government in the economy (Hess et al. 2016). Broadly, the economic right is 
supportive of laissez-faire markets and opposed to government intervention, which is widely 
thought to be necessary for effective environmental regulation (Dunlap et al. 2001; McCright 
and Dunlap 2011). This type of economic ideology – widely referred to as neoliberalism - is 
often used to justify market-oriented preferences that impede decarbonisation (Fielding et al. 
2012; Hess et al. 2016 ;Gillard 2016). In the UK, for example, far-right members of the 
Conservative Party have justified their opposition to climate policy on the grounds that it 
would result in unwarranted state intervention (e.g. carbon tax and ‘green’ subsidies) 
(Lockwood 2013; Carter and Clements 2015). The economic left, on the other hand, is 
supportive of strong government regulation and therefore, theoretically at least, more 
accommodating to the kind of government presence that is needed to drive energy transition. 
The second point of contention is about the importance of the environment relative to other 
issue-areas such as the economy or industry. Broadly, socio-cultural rightists are thought to 
value conservative morality, cultural conformity and traditional priorities such as the 
economy and industry while social leftists place more emphasis on the environment (Hillen 
and Steiner 2019; Batstrant 2015). Empirical research suggests that the association is 
strongest in fossil rich countries, where energy transition is more difficult to reconcile with 
the traditional priorities of the political right because climate policy entails significant 
changes in key sectors of the economy (particularly of fossil industries) (Carter 2014; Hess 
and Renner 2019; Batstrant 2015). 
A small number of scholars investigate whether such ideological dispositions could be a 
factor in shaping public attitudes towards energy preferences. The fundamental focus of this 
research is on the level of support for energy policies that are consistent with decarbonisation, 
centering around renewable (and nuclear) energy (Karlstrom and Ryghaug 2014; Hess et al. 
2016; Populus 2005) and energy-efficient technologies (Gromet et al. 2013). There is no 
consensus on whether voters decide to support parties whose energy policies are consistent 
with their underlying beliefs or individuals harmonise their views in line with their party, 
although most research focuses on the latter possibility (Kousser and Tranter 2018). Most of 
this scholarship proceeds from the assumption that partisanship fulfils an important cognitive 
function by providing voters with cues and ‘information shortcuts’ for formulating opinions 
about energy policy, which is, essentially, an unfamiliar issue for most people (Walker et al. 
2018:671; Mayer 2019).  
There is also disagreement about where political parties’ influence over energy attitudes 
might come from. One argument is that voters are predisposed to support their party’s stance 
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on energy because they are more likely to be consistent with their own pre-existing values, 
belief-systems, and socio-political priorities (Maibach et al. 2013; Petrovic et al. 2014; Wiest 
et al. 2015; Gromet et al. 2013; Stanley et al. 2021). For example, a number of authors concur 
that right-leaning individuals are more likely to support decarbonisation when it is presented 
as a means for pursuing energy security rather than climate mitigation (e.g. Kousser and 
Tranter 2018; Gromet et al. 2013; Maibach et al. 2013). Conservative segments also tend to 
be more supportive of energy transition when it is perceived to be compatible with broader 
economic goals (Gillard 2016; Linde 2018), which is more likely to be the case in countries 
that do not possess large fossil reserves (Hess and Renner 2019; Batstrant 2015). It has also 
been suggested that left-leaning individuals are more likely to support climate policy because 
they tend to hold stronger global than national place attachments (Devine-Wright 2015) and 
lower levels of social dominance beliefs (Stanley et al. 2021), both of which are associated 
with opposition towards energy transition. In another approach, Mayer (2020) proposes that 
in contexts where energy policy is strongly polarised such as the US, political orientation is 
an important part of personal identity, which predisposes supporters of different parties to 
disagree over the energy transition as a way of safeguarding their sense of self. Another 
hypothesis is that voters defer the task of formulating attitudes about energy policy to their 
political party because they trust their leaders to make appropriate judgements, while 
individuals adopt opposing positions to those of other parties due to their mistrust of 
opposition leaders (Kousser and Tranter 2018). Political ideological influence over energy 
attitudes has also been attributed to partisan bias in choice of information sources on energy 
matters and partisan processing of energy information. According to this perspective, 
supporters of different parties tend to consult (and trust) different sources (e.g., media outlets) 
for information about climate change and energy policy and interpret energy information in 
ways that reinforce their underlying political beliefs (Walker et al. 2018).  
The empirical evidence on the extent to which partisanship matters is quite varied. In the US, 
there is evidence of partisanship over low-carbon energy (Mayer 2020), offshore wind 
(Sokoloski et al 2018), oil and gas production (Malin et al 2019) and shale gas (Clarke and 
Evensen 2019). Moreover, given the sharp partisan divide over climate in the US, Feldman 
and Hart (2018) find that a climate change frame lowers support for low-carbon energy 
relative to pollution or security frames among Republicans whereas these different frames 
had no impact on independent or Democratic voters. By contrast, in Germany, Engels et al 
(2013) find no strong political party basis for climate-change skepticism although skepticism 
itself is related to low levels of political participation as well as with lower support for 
renewables and being less critical of nuclear energy. In a comparative study of Australia, 
New Zealand, Sweden and Norway on the role of ‘party cues’, Linde (2018) finds a clear 
polarisation between two distinct left-right groupings of parties in Australia and New Zealand 
over climate mitigation policies, but no such clear grouping between party supporters in 
Norway and Sweden. In particular, Kousser and Tranter (2018) find that respondents are 
guided by positions taken by their political party leaders on the subject of policies for 
addressing climate change – they become more or less polarised along party lines depending 
upon whether their party leaders converge or diverge on a policy proposal.   
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Drawing on this scholarship, we expect that right-leaning individuals are likely to oppose the 
deployment of renewables and CCS because these policies require significant government 
intervention in the economy, e.g. to subsidise renewables, impose a carbon tax and finance 
high start-up investments for large-scale projects, which conflicts with the laissez-faire 
ideology to which they subscribe. Since CCS can be deployed to absorb the carbon emissions 
from fossil fuel plants, there is a counterargument that anti-interventionists could support 
CCS because it allows for continued use of fossil fuels. These policies also assume that 
environmental concerns, particularly climate change, are less paramount to other issue-areas. 
Conversely, while left-leaning individuals should not possess the same kind of aversion 
against extensive government intervention, the alleged higher value that leftist ideologies 
place on the environment provides additional grounds for expecting that they should be more 
supportive of renewables and CCS (Neumayer 2004). Yet we expect that the alleged leftist 
preference for CCS will be less pronounced than that for renewables because of the 
environmental risks (e.g. leakage) that are associated with CCS  (Itaoka et al. 2014; Vogele et 
al. 2018). Furthermore, across the spectrum, because public knowledge about energy 
technologies, particularly more recent technologies such as CCS, is lacking (e.g. Ashworth et 
al. 2019; Hobman and Ashworth 2013), we expect that individuals should generally be 
sensitive to energy cues from their party and turn to political ideology for guidance on a 




The questionnaire design aimed to identify key factors associated with public support for 
twelve energy technologies and sources: biomass, coal, unconventional gas (coal seam gas 
(AU)/shale gas (UK)), natural gas, gas or coal with CCS (as one option), geothermal, hydro, 
nuclear, solar-thermal, solar photovoltaic, tidal and wind energy. It was also intended to 
maintain a level of replicability with other previously conducted questionnaires to monitor 
changes in the evolution of preferences for different energy technologies (e.g. Jeanneret et al. 
2014). The questionnaire was designed in Australia in collaboration with a Chinese team for 
comparative purposes (see Ashworth et. al 2019), first applied in Australia and subsequently 
adapted to the UK context.  
Data collection and sample demographics 
In Australia and the UK, market research companies were engaged to collect data via online 
surveys from nationally representative randomised samples aged 18 years of age and older. In 
Australia, Q & A Research collected data between June and August 2017, and of the 2540 
completed surveys, 2383 valid responses were retained in the final dataset. The geographical 
distribution of participants per state follows a representative random sampling, corresponding 
to state population size (95% confidence level and +/-1.76% confidence interval). Data in the 
UK were collected by Opinium Research between October and November 2017 following the 
general election in June the same year. A total of 2028 valid responses were retained in the 
final dataset. Table 1 in the appendix provides an overview of the socio-demographic 




Descriptive and bivariate analyses (cross-tabulations, one-way ANOVA and t-tests) explored 
relationships between demographic characteristics and self-reported levels of knowledge of 
and support for each of the twelve energy technologies. Factors related to support, and 
perceptions of climate change and environmental attitudes, were also examined. Factor 
analyses and regressions further examined the strength of associations between support for 
energy technologies and key variables, including voting preferences. 
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was conducted for each of the energy sources and 
technologies to examine the effect of political ideology on the dependent variable of interest, 
the public level of support. To ascertain levels of support, participants were presented with 
simple definitions of each technology and asked to indicate how strongly they agreed or 
disagreed (on a scale of 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree) with each as an option for 
generating their country’s future energy needs. 
Self-declared voting preferences were used as a proxy for ideological orientation. 
Respondents were asked to indicate which political party they voted for in the most recent 
elections (2016 in Australia and 2017 in the UK) from a list of the most popular parties as 
well as options for other parties and non-voting. 
Voting preferences were translated into ideological orientation by drawing on existing indices 
of political party positions on a left-right spectrum. While we employ multiple proxies to 
capture ideological orientation in the robustness section below, our main variable is derived 
from the Parties, Institutions and Preferences (PIP) database, which evaluates parties’ 
manifestos to locate parties on a left-right political spectrum (Gabel and Huber 2000). The 
PIP methodology employs content analysis to compare manifesto statements with core left 
(socialist) and right (economically liberal and conservative) principles and assigns parties 
scores from -25 to 25, with negative values denoting left and positive values right-leaning 
ideology.4 Table 1 displays the Left-Right index scores of the main Australian and UK parties 
in the PIP dataset according to the latest manifestos that were published prior to the conduct 
of the surveys. One limitation of the dataset is that it excludes two key parties that 
participated in the 2016 Australian elections - the Nick Xenophon Team (NXT) and Pauline 
Hanson’s One Nation (PHON) - which comprise around ten percent of the voting preferences 
reported in our Australia survey. As part of the robustness analysis below, we draw on 
alternative sources which include NXT and PHON. 
Australia UK 
Abbreviation Party L-R index Abbreviation Party L-R Index 
Greens Australian Greens -20.00 Green Green Party -19.19 
NPA 
National Party of 
Australia 
-1.88 LibDem Liberal Democratic Party -9.81 
ALP Australian Labor Party -1.40 Labour Labour Party -6.32 
LPA Liberal Party of Australia 14.24 Tories Conservative Party -0.73 





Table 1: Main political parties and PIP Left-Right Index scores in Australia and UK. 
 
6 The PIP can be accessed from University of Greifswald, Department of Political Science and Communication 
Studies, Comparative Politics Database: : http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/data.html.  
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To isolate the effect of political ideology from the influence of other sources of public attitudes, 
two independent variables were included in the model: belief in the causes of climate change; 
and self-rated knowledge of the relevant energy technology. Acceptance of anthropogenic 
climate change is believed to increase support for renewable energy and CCS (McCright et al. 
2016; Ashworth et al. 2019). Knowledge has been found to promote acceptance of energy 
technologies (Hobman and Ashworth 2013; Ogarra et al. 2005). Age, gender, income and level 
of education were included as demographic control variables. Table 2 describes the variables, 
associated survey question and coding.  Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix provide the descriptive 
statistics (mean, standard deviation and sample size) of the nonnumeric and numeric variables 
respectively. The data obtained from the Australian and UK surveys were fed into the following 
regression model containing the complete set of variables from Table 2: 
Support(energy technology) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Ideology + 𝛽2CauseCC + 𝛽3Knowledge(energy technology) 
+ 𝛽4Age + 𝛽5Gender + 𝛽6Income + 𝛽7Education 
 
Variable Variable Coding/scale  
Support 
(DV) 
The level of support (or 
opposition) for the deployment 
of the twelve energy 
technologies.   
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the 
following options as potential ways of generating [country 
name]’s future energy needs. Seven-point scale: 
1=strongly disagree, 4=neither agree nor disagree, 
7=strongly agree 
Ideology Self-declared voting preferences 
in the last elections at the time of 
survey. 
Voting preferences were used to infer political ideological 
leanings by assigning each of the major parties involved in 
the last Australian and UK elections a Left-Right index 
score from the Parties, Institutions and Preferences database. 
Scores range from -25 (left-leaning) to 25 (right-leaning).   
CauseCC Respondents were asked to 
choose one of four options to 
denote what they believed to be 
the main source of climate 
change, providing a measure of 
belief in anthropogenic global 
warming.  
Scores were assigned to denote increasing level of 
importance attached to anthropogenic origins of climate 
change in accordance with the ordinal options. 
Assuming global warming is happening, do you think it is: 
(1) No sources because global warming isn’t happening 
(2) Caused mostly by most natural changes in the 
environment 
(3) Caused by both natural changes in the environment and 
human activities 
(4) Caused mostly by human activities 
Knowledge Self-declared level of knowledge 
about each of the twelve energy 
technologies. 
Please indicate your current level of knowledge about the 
following energy sources and technologies. Seven-point 
scale:  
1=no knowledge, 4=moderate knowledge, 7=expert 
knowledge 
Age  Age in years Range (18-91) 
Gender  Binary variable 1 = male, 2 = female 
Income Household total income per year 
(pre-tax) 
Respondents were asked to choose from decile income 
brackets in the appropriate currency.  
Education Highest level of education 
completed 
Respondents were asked to choose from options reflecting 
the main educational brackets in each country as shown in 
the appendix (table A1). 
Table 2: Variables, data sources and coding.  
Results 
Table 3 reports the mean values and standard deviations of the dependent variable, support 
for the various energy technologies, in both samples. The (unequal) t-test statistic and  
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associated p-value (shown in brackets) in the far-right column indicate that the difference in 
means is statistically significant in all cases except solar photovoltaics.   
 
Energy Technology Australia UK T-test statistic  
(p-value)  Mean SD Mean SD 
Biomass  3.55 1.56 4.53 1.39 -22.09 (0.000) 
Coal  3.75 1.79 3.50 1.65   4.78 (0.000) 
Coal seam (AU)/ 
shale gas (UK) 
3.50 1.71 3.36 1.77   2.79 (0.005) 
Gas 4.15 1.55 4.33 1.47 -3.94 (0.000) 
CCS 3.81 1.56 3.95 1.39 -3.30 (0.001) 
Geothermal 4.32 1.55 4.68 1.35 -8.31 (0.000) 
Hydro  5.33 1.31 5.51 1.28 -4.70 (0.000) 
Nuclear  3.67 1.94 4.03 1.85 -6.29 (0.000) 
Solar (thermal) 5.41 1.37 5.58 1.32 -4.29 (0.000) 
Solar (PV) 5.59 1.36 5.60 1.30 -0.10 (0.924) 
Wave  5.11 1.48 5.60 1.38 -11.57 (0.000) 
Wind  5.39 1.51 5.68 1.43 - 6.62 (0.000) 
Table 3: Mean support for energy technologies. AU n=2383; UK n=2030. 
 
Participants in both countries reported higher levels of support for renewables (hydro, solar 
thermal and PV, wave, and wind) and low levels of support for fossil fuels (coal, gas, and 
coal seam/shale gas). While coal was among the least popular energies in both countries, UK 
respondents were noticeably more opposed to it (M=3.50) compared to Australian 
respondents (M=3.75). This is likely to be a reflection of the significant transition away from 
coal power in the UK and Australia’s reliance on coal both for electricity and for export. 
Although biomass energy comprises around ten percent of total renewable electricity 
generation in both countries (IEA 2019), it was even less popular than coal in Australia 
(M=3.55), with UK respondents notably more supportive (M=4.53). The unenthusiastic 
assessment of biomass in Australia has been attributed to concern over the risks it poses to 
native forests and the need for the development of technological capacity to facilitate biofuel 
production in the country (Puri et al. 2012; Puri and Abraham 2012).  In addition, the UK 
expressed somewhat greater support for nuclear energy (M=4.03) compared to Australia 
(M=3.67), which is possibly reflective of greater familiarity with nuclear power in the UK 
since 18.7 percent of generation in 2018 was nuclear power (BEIS 2019), as well as the 
Australian prohibition on nuclear energy that has been in place since the 1960s.   
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of political party ideologies across a left-right spectrum in 
the two countries. While both samples peak around the political centre, the distributions 
differ in important respects. In Australia, party ideologies are distributed across a wider range 
of the L-R spectrum (from -20 to 14.2), suggesting that parties’ ideological views tend to be 
more extreme than in the UK, where ideologies are more concentrated around the centre 
(from -19.2 to 3.7). In addition, Australian party ideologies are noticeably left-skewed 
(skewness = -0.46) indicating that stronger right-leaning ideologies are more popular than in 




Figure 1: Distribution of political ideologies.  
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the regression analysis for each energy technology in 
Australia and the UK respectively.  
Consistent with our expectations, the results suggest that there is significant ideological 
divide in public attitudes towards different energy technologies, particularly between fossil 
fuels and renewables. Broadly, those who voted for parties on the political right are more 
likely to support the deployment of fossil fuels, nuclear energy and CCS while those on the 
political left display higher levels of support for renewables. In both countries, a one-point 
increase in one’s L-R score, which corresponds to a one-point rightwards movement along 
the political spectrum, is associated with a small increase in expressed support (in the range 
of 0.01 to 0.05) for the deployment of coal, shale (coal seam) gas, natural gas, CCS and 
nuclear energy. The coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level or less, indicating statistical 
significance of one percent or higher. This finding aligns with several previous studies which 
have found that adherents of leftist political ideologies tend to place higher value on the 
environment and support effective policy outputs targeting environmental quality. The results 
also provide some evidence that supporters of leftist ideologies are likely to be more 
supportive of renewable energy. In Australia, a one-point increase in an individual’s 
rightward political leaning is associated with a small decrease in support (in the range of 0.01 
to 0.02) for solar thermal, solar PV, wave and wind energy. The results are significant at the 
0.001 level. While the equivalent coefficients for the UK sample (row 1, Table 5) also 
possess negative signs, suggesting an inverse relationship between right-wing ideology and 
renewables, only the wind and wave coefficients are statistically significant. Thus, while 


















-0.33*** -0.26*** -0.27*** 0.06 0.14*** -
0.32*** 
0.39*** 0.39*** 0.36*** 0.49*** 
Knowledge 0.36*** 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.31*** 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 
Age -
0.01*** 
-0.01** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.00 0.00* 0.01*** 0.00 0.00** 0.01*** 0.00* 0.00 
Gender 0.08 -0.14 -0.14* -0.32*** -0.13 -0.23*** -0.06 -
0.45*** 
0.07 0.19* -0.00 0.16** 
Income -0.03* -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.03* -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
Education -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.03** -0.01 0.05* 0.03* 0.03* 0.01 0.02 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 
Table 4: Regressions of PIP ideology and Australian attitudes towards energy technologies (n=1,811). 
Note: Two-sided significance levels indicated by *** for p<0.001, ** for p<0.01 and * for p<0.05.  
 




















0.35*** 0.30*** 0.38*** 0.47*** 
Knowledge 0.21*** 0.03 -0.03 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.18*** 
Age 0.00* 0.01* -0.00 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00* 0.01*** 0.00* -0.00 
Gender -0.03 0.23** 0.48*** -0.03 0.01 -0.11 0.08 -
0.72*** 
0.14** 0.10* 0.15* 0.28*** 
Income 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.05** -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
Education -0.01 -0.18** -0.02 -0.05* -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.08 007 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.11 
Table 5: Regressions of PIP ideology and UK attitudes towards energy technologies (n=1,809). 
Note: Two-sided significance levels indicated by *** for p<0.001, ** for p<0.01 and * for p<0.05.  
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fuels and the left renewables, ideology seems to play a less influential role in shaping 
attitudes towards solar thermal and wave energy in the UK.    
Beyond the division over fossil fuels versus renewables energy options, political ideology 
also seems to play a significant role in shaping attitudes towards fossil fuels with CCS. In 
both countries, a one-point increase in rightward orientation is associated with a statistically 
significant rise in support for gas or coal with CCS by 0.02 points. If, as many previous 
works claim, a more left-wing orientation places higher value on the environment relative to 
right-wing ideologies, the reported positive association between right-leaning ideology and 
CCS may stem from the apparent incompatibility between left-of-centre values and the 
danger that gas or coal with CCS encourages continued reliance on fossil fuels.5 By contrast, 
political ideology is not found to have a statistically significant effect on attitudes towards 
biomass, hydro and geothermal energy in either country.  
Some important observations relating to the independent variables are also worth noting. 
First, out of all the variables (including political ideology), belief in anthropogenic climate 
change and knowledge about each energy technology appear to have the largest significant 
effects on energy attitudes. In both countries, stronger belief in anthropogenic activity as 
being responsible for climate change is associated with greater opposition towards fossil fuels 
(and nuclear energy) and higher support for renewables. Summarising across both countries, 
a one-point increase in anthropogenic belief is associated with a statistically significant 
(absolute) change of 0.10 to 0.57 points in support across the various energy technologies. 
Interestingly, believers of anthropogenic climate change are not more supportive of CCS and 
nuclear as one might expect given the significant potential contribution of the technology to 
mitigation. Our results suggest the contrary scenario that acceptance of anthropogenic climate 
change fuels greater concern over the possible environmental consequences of CCS as a one-
point increase in one’s leftward leaning is associated with a clear decline in support (by 0.27 
points in Australia and 0.23 points in the UK). A one-point increase in self-assessed 
knowledge about each energy technology is associated with a statistically significant increase 
in support for all energy technologies (excluding coal and shale gas in the UK) in range of 
0.13 to 0.36 points. 
Consistent with previous research, the results also suggest that knowledge significantly 
increases support for energy technologies. The only exception is shale gas and coal in the 
UK, where knowledge about the energy sources is not associated with a statistically 
significant effect on attitudes.  
Several of the socio-demographic control variables are also significant, although the effect 
sizes are much smaller compared to the preceding factors. While the effect sizes involved are 
very small (ranging from a thousand of a decimal place to 0.03 points), age has a significant, 
albeit small, effect on shaping attitudes towards most energy options in both countries. 
Broadly, older respondents tend to hold more positive attitudes towards the deployment of 
renewables and nuclear energy in both countries. However, while a one-year increase in 
respondent age is associated with a statistically significant 0.01 point decline in support for 
 
5 This argument is often made by environmental activists (e.g. Greenpeace 2008).  
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biomass, coal and coal seam gas in Australia, age does not appear to have a significant effect 
on corresponding attitudes in the UK. Gender appears to have mixed effects across the 
countries; in Australia, females are significantly less supportive of deploying coal seam gas, 
gas, geothermal and nuclear energy and significantly more supportive of solar PV and wind 
energy than males. While gender has a significant effect on energy attitudes in the UK, the 
directions of the reported effects are largely contradictory to those obtained from the 
Australian sample. The corresponding entries in table five (row five) suggest that, unlike in 
Australia, UK females are significantly more supportive of two key fossil fuels - coal and 
shale gas. The effect of gender on modern renewables is consistent with the Australian results 
as females are reported to be significantly more supportive of solar thermal, solar PV, wave, 
and wind energy than males. Consistent with most attitudinal research (e.g. Sundstrom and 
McCright 2016; Ansolabehere and Konisky 2009,2014), the effect of gender on nuclear 
attitudes is striking and consistent across both countries: females are significantly less 
supportive of nuclear energy than males - by 0.45 points in Australia and 0.72 in the UK. The 
effects of income and education were generally small in magnitude and insignificant.  
Robustness tests 
Two sets of tests were conducted to evaluate the robustness of the above findings and extend 
the inferences about the relationship between political ideology and attitudes towards energy 
technologies. First, the regressions from the last section were repeated using two alternative 
proxies of left-right orientation to evaluate whether the effects of ideology remain consistent 
when the PIP scores are replaced with an alternative continuous proxy as well as categorical 
dummy variables denoting parties. Due to space constraints, the results and discussion of 
these tests are reported in the appendix (see tables A4 and A5). Second, using the same 
survey data, the correlations between Likert responses towards statements about the 
environment and economy and voting preferences were used to create an alternative 
framework for evaluating political orientation based on how environmentally versus 
economically focused parties are. The environment-industry data was regressed with attitudes 
towards energy technologies to determine whether the environmental-economic focus of 
parties influences energy preferences.    
 
Environment-economy orientation 
Concern over the environmental consequences of energy project decisions are a major factor 
in shaping attitudes towards energy technologies. Moreover, as demonstrated by the 
preceding analyses, environmental issues do not always follow the traditional left-right 
schema: for example, some voters from the left and right can agree with each other in putting 
environmental concerns over industrial development and vice versa (Karlstrom and Ryghaug 
2014). Furthermore, as Hillen and Steiner (2019) point out, it is possible to hold leftist socio-
cultural views, which implies greater emphasis on the environment, while, being 
economically rightist or opposed to government market intervention. 
Therefore, in this section, we evaluate parties through the lens of an alternative ideological 
framework based on orientation towards environmental versus economic issues. We infer 
each party’s position on an environment-economy spectrum by regressing the self-declared 
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importance that respondents gave to various environmental, economic and technocratic 
factors (listed in Table 6 below) with political parties. 
Factor  
Environmental issues (e.g. impact on ecosystems, humans, plants and animals) 
Climate issues (e.g. level of CO2 emissions, global warming) 
Economic issues (e.g. job opportunities, knowledge and skill development, power plant building) 
Cost (e.g. installation or maintenance cost) 
Electricity price (i.e. the cost of electricity to you as the consumer of electricity) 
Reliability of electricity supply (i.e. stability in the supply of electricity to your home, ‘power cuts’. 
Table 6: Environmental and economic factors that influence energy attitudes.  
Note: Respondents were asked the following question: ‘In deciding whether or not to support new energy 
sources and related technologies, please indicate how much you consider the following factors’ (on a scale of 1-
7: 1=not at all, 4=to some extent, 7=very much) in reference to the factors listed in the table. 
 
Table 7 shows the coefficients between political parties and responses to each factor. The 
results suggest that there are notable divergences in the emphasis that voters of different 
political parties place on the various factors. In Australia, perhaps unsurprisingly, the Greens 
appear to be the most environmentally-oriented party as supporters tend to express greater 
concern over environmental and climate issues and less over economic, cost and electricity 
reliability issues than other parties. In the UK, Lib Dem supporters appear to express the 
greatest concern over environmental and climate issues, followed by the Green and Labour 
parties. At the other end of the spectrum, the supporters of the PHON in Australia and UKIP 
and Tories in the UK place less emphasis on environmental and climate issues, with PHON 
supporters expressing significantly more concern over cost, electricity price and reliability 
issues in comparison to supporters of other parties.  
The last row of Table 7 averages the coefficients of the six statements to reflect voters’ 
combined responses to all factors and forms the basis of our location of parties on an 
environment-economy spectrum, with lower values indicating higher environmental and 
higher values economic orientation. Since positive associations for the first two statements 
(on environment and climate change) indicate orientation towards environmental issues, 
coefficients in these rows were inverted to align with the interpretation of the other economy-
focused variables.6 Interestingly, the spread of values in our environment-economy-focus 
spectrum in the last row is significantly wider in Australia (ranging from -98.07 to 100.00) 
than in the UK (from -70.16 to 34.64), suggesting that these issues are more polarising across 
party lines in Australian politics. 
The final step of our analysis was to repeat the full regression replacing the L-R proxy with 
our Env-Econ measure to evaluate the influence of environmental-economiceconomic orientation on 
attitudes towards energy technologies.7  Table 8 reports the results alongside the PIP 
coefficients for reference.
 
6 Mean values were stretched to generate a spread of values from approximately -100 to +100.  
7 The env-econ scores in table 7 were rescaled (divided by 1000) to generate coefficients of sufficient magnitude 





Factor Australia (n=2,383) UK (n=2,030) 
Greens NPA ALP LPA NXT PHON Green LDP Labour Tories UKIP 
Environmental 
issues 
0.40** -0.36* -0.01 -0.36*** -0.12 -0.58*** 0.50* 0.54*** 0.50*** 0.08 -0.47*** 
Climate issues  0.76*** -0.38* 0.33** -0.30** 0.12 -0.90*** 0.54* 0.58*** 0.55*** -0.13 -0.74*** 
Economic 
issues 
-0.11 0.29** 0.09 0.22* -0.17 0.28* 0.15 0.24 0.18† 0.21* -0.05 
Cost  -0.29* 0.22 0.03 0.19* -0.11 0.26* -0.43† 0.13 -0.00 0.17† -0.28 
Electricity 
price issues  




-0.43*** 0.01 -0.05 0.07 -0.14 0.17 -0.29 0.12 0.22* 0.29*** -0.12 
Env-Econ 
score 
-98.07 53.10 -11.63 46.51 -22.87 100.00 -70.16 -26.74 -23.64 34.64 24.42 
Table 7: Env-econ correlations and scores by party.  







L-R Env-Econ L-R Env-Econ 
Biomass 0.01 1.23* 0.01 3.42** 
Coal  0.03*** 4.12*** 0.02** 4.54** 
Shale gas 0.03*** 2.96*** 0.05*** 0.02*** 
Gas 0.02*** 2.50*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 
CCS 0.02*** 2.00*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
Geothermal 0.00 0.18 0.00 -0.3.8 
Hydro  -0.00 0.79 -0.00 -0.23 
Nuclear 0.02*** 2.45*** 0.05*** 10.01*** 
Solar (thermal) -0.01*** -1.09*** -0.01 -1.18 
Solar (PV) -0.01*** -0.590 -0.01* -2.63** 
Wave -0.01*** -1.25* -0.01 -1.51 
Wind  -0.02*** -1.92*** -0.02** -10.02 *** 
N 1811 2383 1809 2030 
Table 8: Regression coefficients of environment-economy model. 
Note: Two-sided significance levels indicated by *** for p<0.001, ** for p<0.01 and * for p<0.05.  
 
Interestingly, the signs of the significant Env-Econ coefficients are consistent with the PIP 
estimates, suggesting that environmental focus plays a role somewhat akin to that of leftist 
political ideology, and economic focus to rightist ideology, in shaping energy attitudes.8 In 
both countries, stronger economic focus is significantly associated with higher support for 
fossil fuels (coal and gas) and the controversial technologies (shale (coal seam) gas, CCS, 
nuclear energy and biomass). Though less pronounced than the L-R estimates, economic 
orientation is also significantly associated with less support for wind in both countries. Also 
in accordance with our expectations, economic orientation is also associated with 
significantly lower support for solar thermal and tidal energy in Australia and solar 
photovoltaic and wind energy in the UK. Unlike the PIP results, the Env-Econ results suggest 
that economic orientation is significantly associated with higher support for biomass energy 
in both countries. Like the PIP results, environmental or economic orientation does not have 
a significant effect on attitudes towards geothermal or hydro energy. However, compared to 
PIP results, the magnitudes of even the statistically significant coefficients are smaller in 
magnitude, suggesting that L-R dynamics are more influential than environmental-economic 
focus in shaping energy attitudes.  
 
Conclusion  
The results of this article suggest that political ideology appears to play an important role in 
shaping public attitudes towards a range of energy technologies and the energy transition 
more broadly. When we employ a conventional left-right conceptualisation of ideology, we 
find strong evidence that left-leaning individuals tend to be relatively more supportive of 
 
8 The correlation coefficients are 0.94 and 0.83 respectively for the AU and UK datasets, implying that overlap 
between left-right and environmental-industrial divisions are stronger in Australia.  
19 
 
renewable energies and right-leaning individuals of fossil fuels and more controversial 
energy technologies including CCS, shale (coal seam) gas and nuclear energy. These results 
are robust to choice of proxy and align with much of the existing literature on ideology and 
energy attitudes (e.g. Karlstrom and Ryghaug 2014; Hess et al. 2016; Populus 2005; 
Neumayer 2004).  
Our findings also suggest that different conceptualisations of ideology beyond the traditional 
left-right spectrum are also important in influencing public energy attitudes. As hypothesised, 
we find strong evidence that supporters of environmentally-focused parties tend to be more 
supportive of renewable energies and less supportive of fossil fuels and CCS, shale (coal 
seam) gas and nuclear energy compared to supporters of economically-focused parties. The 
similarities that we find between the attitudes of those who voted for leftist, environment-
focused parties and those who voted for right-wing, economy-focused parties, suggest that 
there may be some overlap between the ways the ideological spectrums appear to influence 
public attitudes towards energy technologies. From a researcher’s perspective, our results 
suggest it may be possible to gauge public opinion towards different energy technologies by 
analysing the relative popularity of political parties and employ dominant ideological 
frameworks to compare the energy attitudes of parties and publics across countries. 
Our research suggests that certain communication strategies might be particularly effective in 
overcoming partisan divisions towards energy policy. Previous works find that supporters of 
different parties respond differently to frames about climate change. Wiest et al. (2015), for 
example, find that focusing on the local impacts of climate change is effective in persuading 
Republicans to take mitigative measures, bringing their attitudes closer to those of 
Democrats. Similarly, Feldman and Hart (2018) find that Republicans are more likely to 
support certain low-carbon energy policies (namely, renewable energy investment, revenue-
neutral carbon taxation and fuel efficiency regulations) when they are framed as ways for 
reducing air pollution or energy dependence rather than climate change. Our findings that 
opposition towards energy transition policies tends to be concentrated among conservative 
segments of the public, who are generally reluctant to support policies that are justified on 
environmental grounds, suggest that frames which resonate with right-leaning individuals 
could prove particularly effective in overcoming opposition to energy transition policies.  
Our research does not address the causal question of whether individuals vote for the party 
that most closely resembles their (pre-existing) beliefs or whether they come to harmonise 
their own attitudes in line with their party. However, it does have implications for how we 
might arrive at cross-partisan consensus if, as some contend (e.g. Tranter 2011,2013; Kousser 
and Tranter 2018), the latter is true. The potential for political leaders to narrow (or widen) 
public attitudes by adopting similar (or opposing) positions has been demonstrated to be 
particularly important in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. This suggests that political 
elites could play an important role in building consensus towards energy policy over the 
recovery period at a time when policymakers and publics are keen to build resilience against 
the other major crisis of the century - climate change. Several international organisations (e.g. 
IMF 2020; OECD 2020) and leading politicians in the largest emitting countries (e.g. Biden 
2020; Jinping 2020) have called for a green recovery, which would stimulate economic 
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growth through investment in low-carbon energy technologies. If political leaders can agree, 
then post-COVID recovery could create a window of opportunity for harmonising the 
attitudes of right-leaning individuals with the more environmentally-oriented energy 
preferences of the political left.  
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To ascertain eligibility, respondents first answered screening questions (age, gender, 
postcode). The questionnaire was divided into seven sections covering a range of topics: (1) 
perceived and objective knowledge of energy technologies; (2) levels of support and 
associated factors for energy technologies; (3) economic trade-offs, e.g. costs and reliability; 
(4) beliefs about climate change and environmental issues; (5) individual and household pro-
environmental and energy behaviours; (6) CCS vs renewable energy perceptions; and (7) 
socio-demographic information, including individual values and political voting behaviour. 
Most questions in the sections on economic trade-offs, climate change, and energy 
behaviours were adapted from the OECD EPIC survey and the World Values Survey, which 
has included similar questions since 1995. The climate change section also included items on 
values, norms and beliefs drawn from Steg, Dreijerink and Abrahamse (2005). Questions on 
individual values were drawn from the CVSCALE (Yoo et al. 2011).  
Data collection 
Data were cleaned and analysed using Stata/MP v.15.1 (StataCorp LLC). Completed surveys 
were discarded if participants had responded in a biased way, such as ‘straightlining’, which 
occurs when respondents ‘fail to differentiate between the items with their answers by giving 
identical (or nearly identical) responses to all items using the same response scale’ and can 
negatively affect both reliability and validity of survey responses [24, p. 521].  
The demographic characteristics of the samples shown in tables A1 and A2 are representative 





Australia (n=2383) UK (n=2030) 
Age 47.50 years (SD=16.82)  50.96 years (SD=15.72) 
Gender      n %      n % 










Education      
Below Year 10 76  (3.19)    
Year 10 or equivalent 206  (8.64) GCSE/ O-level/ CSE 410  
(20.20
) 
Year 11 or equivalent 88  (3.69) Vocational qualifications 208  
(10.25
) 
Year 12 or equivalent 383  (16.07) A level or equivalent 413  
(20.34
) 
Certificate (incl. trade)/ 
Diploma/ Adv. Diploma 
784 (32.90) 
   
Bachelor degree (including 
honours) 
530  (22.24) 





305 (12.80) Masters/ PhD or equivalent 222  (10.94
) 
Other (please specify) 12  (0.50) Other  27  (1.33) 
   No formal qualifications 106  (5.22) 
Income      
Less than $30,000 476  (19.97) Less than £7,000 87  (4.29) 
$30,000 - $59,999 559  (23.45) £7,000 - £12,999 200  (9.85) 
$60,000 - $89,999 459  (19.26) £13,000 - £17,999 186  (9.16) 
$90,000 - $119,999 308  (12.92) £18,000 - £22,999 176  (8.67) 
$120,000 - $149,999 265  (11.12) £23,000 - £28,999 228  
(11.23
) 
$150,000 - $179,999 100  (4.20) £29,000 - £34,999 225  
(11.08
) 
$180,000 - $199,999 49  (2.06) £35,000 - £42,999 245  
(12.07
) 
$200,000 - $219,999 32  (1.34) £43,000 - £52,999 210  
(10.34
) 
$220,000 - $239,999 23  (0.97) £53,000 - £66,999 140  (6.90) 
$240,000 - $269,999 12  (0.50) £67,000 - £118,999 172  (8.45) 
$270,000 - $299,999 15  (0.55) £119,000 - £199,999 19  (0.94) 
More than $300,999 14  (0.59) More than £200,000 6  (0.30) 
Other (please specify) 71  (2.98) Other (please specify) 136  (6.70) 
Voting behaviour      
Greens 267  (11.20) Green 47  (2.32) 
NPA 111  (4.66) LibDem 132  (6.50) 
ALP 807  (33.86) Labour 692  
(34.09
) 
LPA 622  (26.10) Tories 735  
(36.21
) 
NXT 73  (3.06) UKIP 89  (4.38) 
PHON 183  (7.68)    
Table A1: Socio-demographic statistics.  




Variable Australia UK 
Mean Standard 
deviation 




Biomass 3.55 1.56 2383 4.53 1.39 2030 
Coal  3.75 1.79 2383 3.50 1.65 2030 
Shale (coal 
seam) gas 
3.50 1.71 2383 3.36 1.77 2030 
Gas 4.15 1.55 2383 4.33 1.47 2030 
CCS 3.81 1.56 2383 3.95 1.39 2030 
Geothermal  4.32 1.55 2383 4.68 1.35 2030 
Hydro  5.33 1.31 2383 5.51 1.28 2030 
Nuclear  3.67 1.94 2383 4.03 1.85 2030 
Solar 
(thermal) 
5.41 1.37 2383 5.58 1.32 2030 
Solar 
(photovoltaic) 
5.59 1.36 2383 5.60 1.30 2030 
Wave  5.11 1.48 2383 5.60 1.38 2030 
Wind  5.39 1.51 2383 5.68 1.43 2030 
Ideology 
(PIP) 
1.19 11.33 1811 -3.37 4.92 1809 
Ideology 
(ParlGov) 
4.60 2.76 2063 4.94 2.59 2030 
CauseCC 3.13 0.86 2383 3.14 0.86 2030 
Knowledge 
Biomass 1.86 1.36 2383 2.13 1.29 2030 
Coal  3.79 1.46 2383 3.43 1.36 2030 
Shale (coal 
seam) gas 
3.11 1.57 2383 2.49 1.32 2030 
Gas 3.82 1.42 2383 3.37 1.33 2030 
CCS 2.53 1.55 2383 2.43 1.34 2030 
Geothermal  2.67 1.60 2383 2.10 1.29 2030 
Hydro  3.59 1.64 2383 2.85 1.40 2030 
Nuclear  3.37 1.62 2383 3.01 1.39 2030 
Solar 
(thermal) 
3.80 1.55 2383 3.02 1.34 2030 
Solar 
(photovoltaic) 
3.30 1.77 2383 2.87 1.46 2030 
Wave  2.85 1.60 2383 2.65 1.33 2030 
Wind  3.79 1.48 2383 3.23 1.32 2030 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics. 
Robustness test: alternative proxies of left-right orientation 
Political parties have been categorised according to multiple criteria such as, for example, 
where they are situated on left-right (e.g. the PIP, Political Compass, Parliaments and 
Governments, World Values Survey datasets), authoritarian-libertarian (e.g. Political 
Compass dataset) or environment-industry (e.g. Tjernshaugen et al. 2011; Kalrstrom and 
Ryghaug 2014) spectra, creating several different options for translating voting preferences 
into ideological orientation. Moreover, as we elaborate below, each approach carries its own 
strengths and weaknesses and raises concerns about the robustness of the preceding results to 
(ideological) proxy choice.  
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We address these concerns by repeating the previous regressions replacing the PIP with two 
alternative proxies of left-right orientation. Our first proxy is derived from the Parliaments 
and Governments (ParlGov) database and is comparable to the PIP dataset in that it provides 
a continuous series of index scores to capture parties’ left-right orientation. Unlike the PIP 
dataset, ParlGov includes the NXT and PHON parties and incorporates public opinion and 
expert surveys as additional sources for inferring parties’ ideological positions alongside 
manifesto statements (Doring and Regel 2019). Raw scores range from one to ten, 
corresponding to left-right leaning respectively and were multiplied by five to produce a 
comparable spread to the PIP scores. Table 3 summarises the main parties and corresponding 
ParlGov scores.  
 
Australia UK 
Abbreviation Party L-R index Abbreviation Party L-R Index 
Greens Australian Greens 1.5 Green Green Party 2.6 
ALP  Australian Labor Party  3.9  LibDem Liberal Democratic Party 4.3 
NXT Nick Xenophon Team                 6.0 Labour Labour Party 4.4 
LPA Liberal Party of Australia 7.4 Tories Conservative Party 7.4 
NPA 







Paul Hanson’s One 
Nation  
                8.2 
   
Table A3: Main political parties and ParlGov Left-Right Index scores in Australia and GB. 
We also coded political parties as categorical variables to evaluate whether the results remain 
consistent when the continuous measures of ideological orientation are replaced with dummy 
variables. We interpolated parties’ ideological orientations by referring to positions on the 
left-right axes of the relevant Political Compass (PC) charts that were generated nearest the 
time of surveying.9 Tables A4 and A5 report the ideology coefficients from the robustness 
tests alongside the PIP estimates for reference.  
 
9 The 2016 Australian election chart was used to analyse the Australia results and the 2017 chart for the UK. PC 
positions are inferred by evaluating party attitudes towards a series of predetermined survey questions through 
content analysis of parties’ public statements and analysis of candidates’ self-declared Likert-responses to the 
















0.01 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.00 -0.00 0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** 
ParlGov 
(n=2063) 
0.01 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.01 -0.00 0.08*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** 
Party dummy (n=2383) 
Greens -0.17 -0.64** -0.08 -0.44* -0.18 0.07 -0.04 -0.31 0.40* 0.17 0.35* 0.61*** 
Katter -0.28 -0.35 -0.23 -0.10 0.53 -0.85 -0.43 0.54 -0.66 -1.02 -0.85 -0.60 
NPA -0.08 0.31 0.74** 0.22 0.39† 0.17 0.17 0.32 0.05 -0.11 -0.13 0.17 
ALP 0.00 -0.20 0.37† 0.05 0.09 -0.06 -0.14 -0.05 0.19 -0.04 0.03 0.43** 
LPA 0.00 0.35† 0.86*** 0.30† 0.46** 0.03 -0.11 0.36* -0.03 -0.25 -0.18 0.03 
NXT 0.05 -0.37 -0.02 -0.08 -0.32 -0.03 -0.20 -0.01 0.41* 0.06 0.20 0.43* 
PHON 0.24 0.51* 0.72** 0.39* 0.44* 0.13 0.04 0.24 0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.24 
Table A4: Ideology estimates using different L-R proxies for Australia dataset. 


















0.01 0.02 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.00 -0.00 0.05** -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.02** 
ParlGov 
(n=2030) 
0.02 0.02 0.09*** 0.02 0.03** -0.02 0.01 0.11*** -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.04** 
Party dummy (n=2030) 
Green -0.61** -0.53* -
1.16*** 
-0.85*** -0.33 -0.40 † 0.17 -0.83** -0.04 0.45* 0.25 0.18 
SNP 0.06 -0.48* -
1.09*** 
-0.42* -0.11 0.28 0.41* -0.09 0.11 0.34* 0.18 0.27 
PW -0.33 0.45 0.20 0.25 0.38 0.47 0.75 † 0.42 -0.25 0.24 0.12 0.06 
LDP -0.08 -0.59** -0.58** 0.25 -0.34* 0.25 † 0.45** 0.25 0.18 0.29* 0.25* 0.15 
Labour 0.04 -0.18 -
0.64*** 
-0.54** -0.14 -0.02 0.28** 0.05 0.03 0.20* 0.22* 0.17 
Tories 0.17 -0.04 0.31* -0.01 0.19 † -0.03 0.30** 0.88*** 0.18 0.08 0.16 -0.15 
UKIP -0.13 0.28 0.14 -0.06 0.08 -0.30T 0.04 0.50* 0.03 0.06 -0.19 -0.37* 
Table A5: Ideology estimates using different L-R proxies for UK dataset. 






The results obtained from the ParlGov model are strikingly consistent with the PIP estimates, 
both in terms of directions and levels of statistical significance. The PIP and ParlGov 
estimates do, however, exhibit some minor differences. While the signs of all but two of the 
ParlGov estimates correspond to the PIP coefficients10, the latter tend to be larger in absolute 
terms than those from the original dataset (ranging from identical to quadruple the values in 
the first row), providing further evidence in support of our hypothesis that leftist ideologies 
tend to be more supportive of low-carbon and environmentally friendly energy technologies. 
Considering that we accounted for the difference in spread of the indices by multiplying the 
ParlGov indices to span a comparable range of values (i.e., normalise to have a range of 50), 
the latter results provide stronger evidence of the role of left-right ideology in shaping energy 
attitudes.  
Only around one quarter of the entries in the third model with party dummies are statistically 
significant. As we elaborate below, this is probably because most political parties are not 
strongly environment or energy focused and therefore adopt less pronounced stances towards 
energy issues in general. In contrast, parties with a clearer environmental focus such as the 
Greens exhibit stronger (and therefore more significant) preferences for certain technologies 
than other parties which place more emphasis on other issues. Thus a horizontal reading of 
Tables 4 and 5 across the rows provides a more nuanced understanding of the (varying) role 
played by partisanship in shaping energy attitudes which is concealed by the continuous 
proxies. The PIP and ParlGov models could be criticised for inferring too much from the 
political spectrum indices by giving equal weight to parties that are not focused on 
environmental and industry issues.  
A vertical reading of the tables by columns is consistent with the previous results: it suggests 
that CCS, shale (coal seam) gas and nuclear energy are more strongly associated with 
partisan divisions than other technologies. Each of these three energy technology columns 
reveal large significant associations between political party affiliation and technology 
attitudes in comparison to biomass and geothermal, which are the only two technologies that 
do not contain any significant entries in the relevant energy column.  
With reference to the ideological axes in the relevant PC charts, the ideological inferences 
drawn from the current model are broadly consistent with our previous findings. In both 
countries, left-wing parties tend to be more supportive of renewables and opposed to the 
deployment of fossil fuel-based energies as well as the more controversial technologies (shale 
gas, CCS and nuclear). This is particularly clear for the Green parties in both countries, 
which are significantly associated with higher support for solar, wave and wind and less 
support for coal, shale gas, gas, CCS and nuclear energy. On the other end of the spectrum, 
right-leaning parties (i.e. the AU NPA, LPA and PHON and UK Tories and UKIP) tend to 
exhibit stronger support for fossil fuels and controversial energy technologies and less 
support for renewables. However, as in the PIP and ParlGov models, comparatively fewer 
 
10 The two exceptions are geothermal and hydro in the UK dataset, which were found to be negligible and 
statistically insignificant in both the PIP and ParlGov regressions.  
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technologies are found to be significantly correlated with right-leaning parties in both 
countries. Ideology has fewer determinate effects over energy attitudes in the political centre 
where parties such as the AU ALP and UK PW do not align with either set of ideal-typical 
expectations associated with left or right orientation.  
 
